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 En este artículo el autor examina la obra de Ronald Dworkin y evalúa su legado para la 
filosofía jurídica, moral y política. Así, considera entre sus méritos el haber desarrollado una 
teoría jurídica original con su metodología distintiva, la cual no solamente ha trascendido la 
dicotomía entre derecho natural y positivismo jurídico, sino además ha reintegrado al derecho 
como una rama de la moralidad política y defendido como corolario la tesis de la única 
respuesta correcta. De esta forma, comienza por identificar el desafío dworkiniano; continúa al 
introducir algunas definiciones y distinciones básicas entre jurisprudencia, filosofía jurídica (o 
filosofía del derecho) y teoría jurídica (o teoría del derecho), de un lado, y su relación con la 
metodología, del otro; después al apuntar las diferentes metodologías disponibles a las teorías 
jurídicas, a partir de las distinciones tanto entre descriptiva y prescriptiva o normativa, por 
una parte, como entre general y particular, por la otra; luego al revisitar el modelo de Dworkin, 
mismo que caracteriza como constructivo, interpretivo (e inclusive argumentativo), evaluativo e 
integrativo; y, concluye al reconsiderar en esta luz la tesis de la única respuesta correcta. 
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Abstract: 
In this paper the author addresses Ronald Dworkin’s work and assesses his legacy to legal, 
moral and political philosophy. And so, considers among its merits having developed an 
original legal theory with its distinctive methodology, which not only has transcended the 
Natural Law and Legal Positivism dichotomy, but also has reintegrated law into a branch of 
political morality and defended as a corollary the one right answer thesis. Hence, commences 
by identifying the dworkininan challenge; continues by introducing some basic definitions and 
distinctions between jurisprudence, legal philosophy (or philosophy of law) and legal theory (or 
theory of law), on the one hand, and its relationship to methodology, on the other hand; later 
by pointing out the main methodologies available to legal theories, following the distinctions 
between descriptive and prescriptive or normative, on one side, and, general and particular, on 
the other; then by revisiting Dworkin’s model, which he characterizes as constructive, 
interpretive (and even argumentative), evaluative and integrative; and, concludes by 
reconsidering in this light the one right answer thesis. 
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For all practical purposes, there will always be a right answer in the seamless web of our law. 
Ronald Dworkin, ‘No Right Answer?’ (1977) 
 
This “no right answer” thesis cannot be true by default in law any more than in ethics or 
aesthetics or morals. 
Ronald Dworkin, ‘Objectivity and Truth: You’d Better Believe It’ (1996) 
 
Sheldon: What is the best number? By the way, there’s only one correct answer. 
Raj: 5,318,008? 
Sheldon: Wrong! The best number is 73. [Short silence] You’re probably 
wondering why? 
Leonard: No. 
Howard: Uh-uh. 
Raj: We’re good. 
Sheldon: 73 is the 21st prime number. Its mirror, 37, is the 12th, and its mirror, 
21, is the product of multiplying, hang on to your hats, 7 and 3. Heh? 
Heh? Did I lie? 
Leonard: We get it! 73 is the Chuck Norris of numbers! 
Sheldon: Chuck Norris wishes! In binary, 73 is a palindrome, 1-0-0-1-0-0-1, 
which backwards is 1-0-0-1-0-0-1, exactly the same. All Chuck Norris 
backwards gets you is “Sirron Kcuhc”. 
Raj: Just for the record, when you enter 5,318,008 in a calculator, upside-
down it spells “boobies”. 
The Big Bang Theory, “The Alien Parasite Hypothesis”, Series 4, Episode 10 (2010). 
 
I. Introduction 
Addressing Ronald Dworkin’s work and assessing his legacy are the main aims 
of this paper. Let me point out in advance that in my opinion he is the greatest 
legal philosopher and theorist ever and is among the most influential moral 
and political philosopher of our time. In a few words, he developed an original 
legal theory with its distinctive methodology, which not only has transcended 
the Natural Law and Legal Positivism dichotomy, but also has reintegrated law 
into a branch of political morality and defended as a corollary the one right 
answer thesis. 
As advanced in the “Introduction” to his celebrated Taking Rights 
Seriously he aimed to “define and defend a liberal theory of law” by being 
sharply critical of another theory widely thought to be liberal, i.e. the “ruling 
theory of law”, which “has two parts and insists on their independence”. The 
first part is a “theory about what law is”, i.e. “the theory of legal positivism, 
which holds that the truth of legal propositions consists in facts about rules 
that have been adopted by specific social institutions, and in nothing else.” The 
second is a “theory about what the law ought to be”, i.e. “the theory of 
utilitarianism, which holds that law and its institutions should serve the 
general welfare, and nothing else.”1  
Contrary to the insistence about the independence of both parts, he 
claims: “A general theory of law must be normative as well as conceptual.”2 
Bear in mind that this claim will allow Dworkin to collapse the distinction 
between descriptive and prescriptive:3  
Its normative part must treat a variety of topics indicated by the following catalogue. It 
must have a theory of legislation, of adjudication, and of compliance; these three 
theories look at the normative questions of law from the standpoint of a lawmaker, a 
judge, and an ordinary citizen. The theory of legislation must contain a theory of 
legitimacy, which describes the circumstances under which a particular person or 
group is entitled to make law, and a theory of legislative justice, which describes the law 
they are entitled or obliged to make. The theory of adjudication must also be complex: it 
must contain a theory of controversy, which sets out standards that judges should use 
to decide hard cases at law, and a theory of jurisdiction, which explains why and when 
judges, rather than other groups or institutions, should make the decisions required by 
the theory of controversy. The theory of compliance must contrast and discuss two 
roles. It must contain a theory of deference, which discusses the nature and limits of 
the citizen’s duty to obey the law in different forms of state, and under different 
circumstances, and a theory of enforcement, which identifies the goals of enforcement 
                                                
1 Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Harvard UP & Duckworth 1977; 2nd edn 
‘with an “Appendix: A Reply to Critics”’, Harvard UP & Duckworth 1978) vii. 
2 ibid  
3 ibid vii-viii (emphasis added) 
and punishment, and describes how official should respond to different categories of 
crime or fault. 
In a few words, he connects or even --as I will argue-- integrates both 
parts, i.e. the normative and the conceptual, not only within a general theory of 
law but also with other departments of philosophy. In his own voice:4  
The interdependencies of the various parts of a general theory of law are 
therefore complex. In the same way, moreover, a general theory of law will have many 
connections with other departments of philosophy. The normative theory will be 
embedded in a more general political and moral philosophy which may in turn depend 
upon philosophical theories about human nature or the objectivity of morality. The 
conceptual part will draw upon the philosophy of language and therefore upon logic and 
metaphysics… A general theory of law must therefore constantly take up one or another 
disputed position on problems of philosophy that are not distinctly legal.  
 In short, Dworkin’s powerful critique of law as a model or system of rules 
and of legal positivism as a form of legal conventionalism, as well as his 
conception of law as constructive interpretation, as a chain novel, as integrity, 
as an interpretive concept, and as a branch of political morality, among many 
other features of his theory, challenged not only the then clearly dominant legal 
theory but also its methodology, which claims to be general and descriptive or 
even indirectly evaluative but still morally neutral.5 
Hence, after identifying Dworkin’s challenge, including the existence of 
persistent and pervasive disagreements within the different legal theories that 
                                                
4 ibid viii-ix  
5 See for the early version Ronald Dworkin, ‘The Model of Rules’ (1967) 35 U of Chi L Rev 
14 (reprinted as ‘Model of Rules I’ in Dworkin (n 1); references will be made to this version); 
Ronald Dworkin, ‘Social Rules and Legal Theory’ (1972) 81 Yale L J 855 (reprinted as ‘Model of 
Rules II’ in Dworkin (n 1); references will be made to this version); and Ronald Dworkin, ‘Hard 
Cases’ (1974) 88 Harvard L Rev 1057 (reprinted in Dworkin (n 1); references will be made to 
this version), as well as the other essays reprinted or published originally in Dworkin (n 1); see 
for the later version, Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire (Harvard UP 1986); and for the latest 
version Ronald Dworkin, Justice for Hedgehogs (Harvard UP 2011) 
arguably describe the same phenomenon,6 but that actually prescribe a 
different solution to it, I intend: in section II, to introduce some basic 
definitions and distinctions between jurisprudence, legal philosophy (or 
philosophy of law) and legal theory (or theory of law), on one side, and its 
relationship to methodology, on the other; in section III, to point out the main 
methodologies available to legal theories; in section IV, to revisit Dworkin’s 
model; and, finally, in section V, to conclude by briefly reconsidering the one 
right answer thesis. 
II. Definitions and Distinctions 
The aim of this section is: first, to introduce some basic definitions and 
distinctions between “jurisprudence”, “legal philosophy” or “philosophy of law”, 
and “legal theory” or “theory of law”; and, second, to point out their relations to 
the so-called “legal methodology” (or “methodology”, for short). Although the 
terms “jurisprudence”, “legal philosophy” or “philosophy of law”, and “legal 
theory” are used more or less interchangeably, I will like to point out that the 
different labels are helpful in order to figure out the underlying “methodology”, 
including its scientific, philosophical and theoretical presumptions and 
presuppositions.7  
Since Roman times, following the famous definitions, placed in a passage 
at the beginning of the Digest of Justinian, by Ulpian “Iurisprudentia est 
divinarum atque rerum notitia, iusti atque injusti scientia” (i.e. “Jurisprudence is 
the knowledge of things divine and human; the science of the just and unjust”), 
and by Celso “Ius est ars boni et æqui” (i.e. “Law is the art of the good and fair”), 
                                                
6 See Dan Priel, ‘Jurisprudential Disagreements and Descriptivism’ (2014) 8 Problema. 
Anuario de Filosofía y Teoría del Derecho 483 
7 In this section, I am following Larry Solum, ‘Legal Theory Lexicon 044: Legal Theory, 
Jurisprudence, and the Philosophy of Law’, in Legal Theory Lexicon 
http://lsolum.typepad.com/legal_theory_lexicon/2003/44/legal_theory_le.html and 
http://legaltheorylexicon.blogspot.com/2005/05/legal-theory-lexicon-044-legal-theory.html 
accessed 14 November 2014  
the word “jurisprudence” denotes the scientific knowledge of “law”, which is its 
object or subject-matter.8 
 Curiously, John Austin in The Uses of the Study of Jurisprudence (1863), 
published thirty-one years after The Province of Jurisprudence Determined 
(1832), on the one hand, cautioned that the word “Jurisprudence itself is not 
free from ambiguity”, since it has been used to denote both “The knowledge of 
Law as a science” and of “Legislation… as the science of what ought to be done 
towards making good laws”, but, on the other hand, apparently conceded: 
“With us, Jurisprudence is the science of what is essential to law, combined 
with the science of what ought to be.”9 Nevertheless, the word “jurisprudence” 
is used to refer to a science (or part of it), as well as to the scientific knowledge 
of “law”. 
Whereas the expressions “legal philosophy” or “philosophy of law” by 
using the word “philosophy” suggest that the distinctive knowledge (or at least 
the method) is not scientific per se but philosophical, irrespective of whether 
there is a close or not relationship between science and philosophy, following 
the adagio: “philosophy is the mother of all sciences”. The fact that both 
                                                
8 John Austin uses this passage from the Roman jurists as an example of the 
“2nd.Tendency to confound positive law with positive morality, and both with legislation and 
deontology” but nevertheless affirms: “jurisprudence… is the science of law”, see ‘The Province 
of Jurisprudence Determined’ (first published 1832) in The Province of Jurisprudence 
Determined and The Uses of the Study of Jurisprudence (Hackett Publishing 1998) Lecture V, 
188-90; see ibid 189: “Now jurisprudence, if it is anything, is the science of law, or at most the 
science of law combined with the art of applying it; but what it here given as a definition of it, 
embraces not only law, but positive morality, and even the test to which both these are to be 
referred. It therefore comprises the science of legislation and deontology.”  
For Austin’s conception of jurisprudence as a science and its proper province, see ibid 
126: “The science of jurisprudence (or, simply and briefly, jurisprudence) is concerned with 
positive laws, or with laws strictly so called, as considered without regard to their goodness and 
badness” (emphasis original)  
9 John Austin, “The Uses of the Study of Jurisprudence” (first published 1863) in 
Austin (n 8) 372 (emphasis original) 
jurisprudence and legal philosophy or philosophy of law, during the XIX and 
XX centuries, were done all over the world exclusively by lawyers (or jurists), 
without a formal degree on philosophy, reinforced the view that the terms 
where used --or at least can be used-- interchangeably. This fact remained 
unchallenged until H.L.A Hart, a philosopher by formation, who at some point 
planned to become an barrister and hence was studying for the bar before 
joining M15 during the Second World War, started --as Nicola Lacey put it-- 
“Selling Philosophy to Lawyers” as “The Chair of Jurisprudence” in Oxford.10 
Though I am absolutely convinced that Hart sold analytic or linguistic 
philosophy to lawyers, he did still used the terms more or less interchangeably, 
but certainly with a clear and distinctive philosophical emphasis.11 In that 
sense, I am not completely persuaded that the usage of “jurisprudence” is 
reserved for law schools or lawyers (or jurists) and “legal philosophy” or 
“philosophy of law” for philosophy departments or philosophers.12 From my 
point of view the relevant distinction is whether “jurisprudence” and “legal 
philosophy” or “philosophy of law” is done by lawyers (or jurists) or by 
philosophers. Ideally, it should be done both by lawyers (or jurists) with a 
philosophical background and by philosophers with a legal one.  
Finally, the terms “legal theory”, “theory of law” and even “theory about 
law” are much more broader by encompassing not only “jurisprudence” and 
“legal philosophy” or “philosophy of law” but also theorizing from a variety of 
other perspectives, including “law and economics”, “law and politics”, “law and 
                                                
10 See Nicola Lacey, A Life of H.L.A. Hart. The Nightmare and the Noble Dream (OUP 
2004) 155-78. 
11 See HLA Hart, The Concept of Law (OUP 1961; 2nd edn ‘With a “Postscript” edited by 
Penelope A. Bulloch and Joseph Raz’, OUP 1994; and 3rd edn ‘With an “Introduction and 
Notes” by Leslie Green’, OUP 2012); see also HLA Hart, Law, Liberty and Morality (Stanford UP, 
1963); HLA Hart, Punishment and Responsibility. Essays in the Philosophy of Law (OUP 1968); 
HLA Hart, Essays on Bentham. Jurisprudence and Political Theory (OUP 1982); and, HLA Hart, 
Essays in Jurisprudence and Philosophy (OUP 1983) 
12 cf Solum (n 7) affirming that Hart “had a dominant influence in defining the content 
of courses on philosophy of law in philosophy departments and jurisprudence in law schools” 
literature”, “law and society”, as well as critical approaches, and so on.13 To the 
extent, that Solum affirms that “legal theory” is “currently the best neutral term 
for referring to legal theorizing, broadly understood.”14 Nonetheless, since there 
is not a one and only method of theorizing about law, let me suggest that there 
are several methodologies and hence legal theories.  
III. Legal Theories and Methodologies 
Let me start this section by quoting H.L.A. Hart’s clarification of the aims of his 
legal theory and its basic methodological presumptions and presuppositions in 
the “Postscript” to The Concept of Law:15 
My aim in this book was to provide a theory of what law is which is both general 
and descriptive. It is general in the sense that it is not tied to any particular legal 
system or legal culture, but seeks to give an explanatory and clarifying account 
of law as a complex social and political institution with a rule-governed (and in 
that sense ‘normative’) aspect… My account is descriptive in that it is morally 
neutral and has no justificatory aims: it does not seek to justify or commend on 
moral or other grounds the forms and structures which appear in my general 
account of law, though a clear understanding of these is, I think, an important 
preliminary to any useful moral criticism of law. 
At the outset of the clarification, we can identify two basic methodological 
distinctions as applied to legal theories: 
1) The distinction between general legal theories that respond to 
“questions about what is common to all legal systems and cultures” and 
particular legal theories that respond to  “questions about what is specific to a 
legal system or culture”;16 and 
                                                
13 See, for example, Brian Bix, Jurisprudence: Theory and Context (3rd edn, Sweet & 
Maxwell 2003)  
14 See Solum (n 7) (emphasis original) 
15 HLA Hart, “Postscript”, in Hart (n 11) 239-40 
16 The distinction between “general and particular jurisprudence” can be traced all the 
way back to Austin, see Austin (n 9) 372: “Particular [or National] Jurisprudence is the science 
of any actual system of law, or of any portion of it.” See ibid 373: “The proper subject of 
General or Universal Jurisprudence… is a description of such subjects and ends of Law as are 
common to all systems”; cf Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and 
2) The distinction between descriptive legal theories with explanatory 
aims that respond to “questions about what the law is” or “questions about 
facts”; and normative legal theories with justificatory aims that respond to 
“questions about what the law ought to be” or “questions about values”.17 
General 
                                                                                                                                                       
Legislation (first published 1789, JH Burns and HLA Hart eds, OUP 1996) Chapter XVII, §§ 21-
9, 293-300 (referring to the different branches of jurisprudence and using the parallel 
distinctions between “universal and internal, local, national, particular or provincial 
jurisprudence”) 
17 I am not only following Julie Dickson, Evaluation and Legal Theory (Hart Publishing 
2001) 1-28, and 29-49, but also adapting Hart’s distinction between “descriptive / explanatory 
and normative / justificatory legal theory”, Hart (n 15) 239-40, which is parallel to Bentham’s 
“expository and censorial jurisprudence”, see Bentham (n 16) Chapter XVII, § 21, 293-4: “A 
book of jurisprudence can have but one or the other of two objects: 1. to ascertain what the 
law is: 2. to ascertain what it ought to be. In the former case it may be styled a book of 
expository jurisprudence; in the latter, a book of censorial jurisprudence” (emphasis original), 
see also Jeremy Bentham, A Fragment on Government (first published 1776, JH Burns and HLA 
Hart eds, Cambridge UP 1988) 7: “There are two characters, one or other of which every man 
who finds any thing to say on the subject of Law, may be said to take upon him; --that of the 
Expositor, and that of the Censor. To the province of the Expositor it belongs to explain to us 
what, as he supposes, the Law is: to that of the Censor, to observe to us what he thinks it 
ought to be. The former, therefore, is principally occupied in stating, or in enquiring after facts: 
the latter, in discussing reasons.” cf Hart, Essays on Bentham… (n 11) 1-2, 41 and 137  
However, I am also adopting both Arthur Ripstein’s distinction between “normative and 
analytic jurisprudence”, see ‘Normative and Analytic Jurisprudence’, in IVR Encyclopaedia of 
Jurisprudence, Legal Theory and Philosophy of Law http://www.ivr-
enc.info/index.php?title=Normative_and_Analytic_Jurisprudence accessed 14 November 2014; 
and, Larry Solum’s distinction between “positive and normative legal theory”, see ‘Legal Theory 
Lexicon 016: Positive and Normative Legal Theory’, in Legal Theory Lexicon 
http://lsolum.typepad.com/legal_theory_lexicon/2003/12/legal_theory_le.html accessed 14 
November 2014 
In Solum’s terminology “Positive legal theory seeks to explain what the law is and why it 
is that way, and how laws affect the world, whereas Normative legal theories tell us what the 
law ought to be… Or more simply: positive legal theories are about facts and normative legal 
theories are about values.”  
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Furthermore, the clarification suggests that since there are there two 
axis --the one distinguishing general and particular legal theories, and the other 
descriptive / explanatory and normative / justificatory legal theories-- there are 
four resulting quadrants that correspond to four initial possibilities: (1) general 
and descriptive / explanatory legal theories; (2) general and normative / 
justificatory legal theories; (3) particular and descriptive / explanatory legal 
theories; and (4) particular and normative / justificatory legal theories. Moreover, 
nothing precludes a more comprehensive legal theory that includes more than 
one quadrant and that correspond to four additional possibilities combining: 
(1) and (2); (3) and (4); (1) and (3); and (2) and (4); and, even a much more 
comprehensive theory that integrates the four quadrants and a further 
possibility combining: (1), (2), (3), and (4).18  
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18 Let me advance that for the purposes of this paper, I am especially interested in the 
possibility of connecting (1) “general descriptive / explanatory legal theory” and (2) “general 
normative / justificatory legal theory”, on the one hand, and (3) “particular descriptive / 
explanatory legal theory” and (4) “particular normative / justificatory legal theory”, on the other 
hand, and even the possibility of contrasting (1) and (3), on one side, and (2) and (4), on the 
other. The only two options that I do not consider feasible because they will turn out to be 
logically fallacious are connecting: (1) and (4); and (2) and (3); and, hence, they are completely 
ruled out. 
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Traditionally, natural law theories do accept and even embrace the 
normative dimension to the extent that they appear to be clearly justificatory, 
whereas positive law theories reject it by claiming to remain (purely or solely) 
descriptive, to the extent that they are explanatory.  
On the one hand, additionally to Hart, John Austin and Hans Kelsen as 
well as other positive law theorists, i.e. legal positivists, are representative of 
(1). For example, Austin famously appealed: “The existence of law is one thing; 
its merit or demerit is another. Whether it be or not be is one enquiry; whether 
it be or nor be conformable to an assumed standard, is a different enquiry. A 
law, which actually exists, is a law, though we happen to dislike it, or though it 
vary from the text, by which we regulate our approbation and 
disapprobation.”19 Analogously, Kelsen --at the beginning of both editions of 
his Reine Rechstlehre-- asserted:20 
The Pure Theory of Law is a theory of positive law. It is a theory of positive law in 
general, not of a specific legal order. It is a general theory of law, not an interpretation 
of specific national or international legal norms; but it offers a theory of interpretation.  
As a theory, its exclusive purpose is to know and to describe its object. The 
theory attempts to answer the question what and how the law is, not it ought to be. It is 
a science of law (jurisprudence), not legal politics. 
                                                
19 Austin (n 8) Lecture V, 184 
20 Hans Kelsen, Pure Theory of Law (Max Knight tr, 2nd edn, University of California 
Press 1967) Chapter I, § 1, 1 (emphasis original); cf Hans Kelsen, Introduction to the Problems of 
Legal Theory (Bonnie Litschewski Paulson and Stanley L. Paulson trs, OUP 1992) Chapter I, § 
1, 7: “The Pure Theory of Law is a theory of positive law, of positive law as such, and not of any 
special system of law. It is general legal theory, not an interpretation of particular national or 
international legal norms. / As theory, the Pure Theory of Law aims solely at cognition of its 
subject-matter, its object. It attempts to answer the questions of what the law is and how the 
law is made, not the questions of what the law ought to be or how the law ought to be made. 
The Pure Theory of Law is legal science, not legal policy.”  
On the other hand, certainly Saint Augustine of Hippo and other 
classical natural law theorists are representative of (2) since they appear to 
hold that the normative exhausts the content and nature of the law or 
alternately that the law is reduced to the prescriptive to the extent that “iniustia 
lex, non est lex”, i.e. “unjust law is not law at all”.21  
As already advanced, I am especially interested in the possibility of 
connecting (1) and (2), on the one hand, and (3) and (4), on the other hand, and 
even the possibility of contrasting (1) and (3), on one side, and (2) and (4), on 
the other. Therefore, a legal theorist can not only be fixated in either describing 
and explaining or prescribing and justifying, or both; but also be focused in 
either what is common to all legal systems and cultures or what is specific of a 
particular legal system and culture, or both.  
Actually, following Bentham’s distinctions, nothing prevents a legal 
theorist from exposing first what is specific of a particular legal system or 
culture (3) and censoring it later (4). Analogously, also following Bentham, 
nothing precludes a legal theorist from exposing first what is common to all 
legal systems or cultures (1) and censoring it later (2).22 However, in the 
remainder of this section, we will bracket the former possibility and will focus 
on the latter possibility, i.e. the connection or not between (1) and (2). 
In that sense, most legal positivists --following Austin, Kelsen and Hart-- 
have insisted in the independence between (1) and (2) and have been claiming 
to be committed exclusively to (1) by suggesting that whenever the normative / 
justificatory dimension appears it is not longer law but morality what is at 
                                                
21 See Saint Augustine of Hippo, On Free Choice of the Will (written in between 387-9 
and 391-5, Thomas Williams tr, Hackett Publishing 1993) Book 1, 5, n. 11, 8: “an unjust law is 
not law at all”; cf Saint Thomas Aquinas, On Law, Morality and Politics (selections of Summa 
Theologica) (written in between 1265-74, Richard J. Reagan tr, Hackett Publishing 2002) 
Question 95 “On Human Law”, Second Article “Is Every Human Law Derived form the Natural 
Law”, 54: “Augustine says in his work On Free Choice: “Unjust laws do not seem to be laws”   
22 See Bentham (n 16) Chapter XVII, §§ 21-9, pp. 293-300  
stake; and, hence, law can remain morally neutral23 or indirectly evaluative;24 
and so have been labeled as “hard” or “exclusive legal positivists”. Similarly, 
even those that admit that there are contingent relationships between (1) and 
(2) seem to subordinate (2) to (1), due to the fact that it is the law, which 
includes or incorporates references to morality,25 and even can be reduced 
accordingly to a mere or pure conceptual analysis without normative / 
justificatory aims,26 and so have been labeled as “soft”, “inclusive legal 
positivists” or “incorporationists”. Moreover, some legal positivists have 
conceded to different extent by recognizing the possibility27 and even the 
necessity28 of connecting both (1) and (2). Finally, some natural law theorists, 
following Saint Thomas Aquinas dictum “Non lex, sed legis corruptio”29 seem to 
be adopting a form of weak natural law theory that connects both (1) and (2). 
                                                
23 See Joseph Raz, Ethics in the Public Domain (OUP 1994); Andrei Marmor, Positive Law 
and Objective Value (OUP 2001); and Scott Shapiro, Legality (Harvard UP 2011) 
24 See Dickson (n 17) 
25 See Jules L Coleman, The Practice of Principle. In Defense of a Pragmatist Approach 
(OUP 2001); and, Wilfrid J Waluchow, Inclusive Legal Positivism (OUP 1994) 
26 See Kenneth E Himma, ‘Reconsidering a Dogma: Conceptual Analysis, the 
Naturalistic Turn, and Legal Philosophy’, in Ross Harrison (ed), Law and Philosophy: Current 
Legal Issues (OUP 2008); cf Andrei Marmor, ‘Farewell to Conceptual Analysis (in 
Jurisprudence)’, in Wil Waluchow and Stefan Sciaraffa (eds), Philosophical Foundations of The 
Nature of Law (OUP 2013); and, cf also Brian Leiter, Naturalizing Jurisprudence. Essays on 
American Legal Realism and Naturalism in Legal Philosophy (OUP 2007)    
27 See Fred Schauer, ‘Positivism as Pariah’ in Robert P. George (ed), The Autonomy of 
Law. Essays on Legal Positivism (OUP 1996); Solum (n 17); and, Adrian Vermeule, ‘Connecting 
Positive and Normative Legal Theory’ (2008) 10 U Penn J Constl Law 387 
28 See Tom Campbell, The Legal Theory of Ethical Positivism (Ashgate 1996); Neil 
MacCormick, ‘A Moralistic Case for A-Moralistic Law’ (1985) 20 Valparaiso LR 1; Liam Murphy, 
‘The Political Question of the Concept of Law’ in Jules L Coleman (ed), Hart’s Postscript. Essays 
on the Postscript to the Concept of Law (OUP 2001); and, Jeremy Waldron, ‘Normative (or 
Ethical) Positivism’, in ibid 
29 Aquinas (n 21) 54: “And a human law diverging in any way from the natural law will 
be a perversion of law and no longer a law”; cf John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights 
To conclude this section I will like to advance my claim that Dworkin’s 
model is neither fixated in either describing and explaining or prescribing and 
justifying, but in both, nor focused in either what is common to all legal 
systems and cultures or what is specific of a particular legal system and 
culture, but in both. Let me clarify that Dworkin integrates (1), (2), (3) and (4) 
into a much more complex legal framework by combining the different 
possibilities or more precisely by blurring the lines dividing them.30 
Keep in mind that Dworkin not only blurs the lines diving the different 
possibilities, i.e. general and particular, descriptive / explanatory and 
normative / justificatory but also collapses the distinctions between creation 
and application, between legislation and adjudication, and most notably 
between theory and practice. For example, in Law’s Empire, Dworkin affirms: 
on one side, “Jurisprudence is the general part of adjudication, silent prologue 
to any decision at law”;31 and, on the other, “Interpretative theories are by their 
nature addressed to a particular legal culture, generally the culture to which 
their authors belong”.32  
  
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
 
  
(3) 
 
(4) 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                       
(OUP 1980; 2nd edn, OUP 2011); and, Mark C. Murphy, ‘The Explanatory Role of the Weak 
Natural Law Theory’ in Waluchow and Sciaraffa (eds) (n 26)  
30 I am grateful to Dan Priel who pointed out to me the importance of emphasizing the 
blurring of the lines dividing the different possibilities. 
31 Dworkin, Law’s Empire (n 5) 90; cf Duncan Kennedy, A Critique of Adjudication (fin de 
siècle) (Harvard UP 1997) 30-8 
32 ibid 102; see Ronald Dworkin, A Matter of Principle (Harvard UP 1985); and, see also 
Ronald Dworkin, ‘Legal Theory and the Problem of Sense’ in Ruth Gavison (ed), Issues in 
Contemporary Legal Philosophy (OUP 1987) 
 IV. Dworkin’s Legal Theory and Methodology 
In this section, I will like to revisit some features of Dworkin’s model, which we 
can characterize as being: a) constructive; b) interpretive (and even 
argumentative); c) evaluative; and d) integrative.  
a) Constructive. Ever since the publication of his book review on John 
Rawls’ A Theory of Justice in 197333 and all the way to his Justice for 
Hedgehogs,34 Dworkin distanced himself from a “natural” model and endorsed 
a “constructive” one. The “natural” model presupposes a philosophical position 
that describes an objective moral reality, which is not created by human 
beings, but rather discovered by them, as the laws of physics: “Moral reasoning 
or philosophy is a process of reconstructing the fundamental principles by 
assembling concrete judgments in the right order, as a natural historian 
reconstructs the shape of the whole animal from the fragments of its bones 
that he has found.”35 On the contrary, the “constructive” model “treats 
intuitions of justice not as clues to the existence of independent principles, but 
rather as stipulated features of a general theory to be constructed, as if the 
sculptor set himself to carve the animal that best fits a pile of bones he 
happened to find together”.36 In his own voice:37 
This ‘constructive’ model does not assume, as the natural model does, that principles of 
justice have some fixed, objective existence, so that descriptions of these principles 
must be true or false in some standard way. It does not assume that the animal it 
matches to the bones actually exists. It makes the different, and in some ways more 
complex, assumption that men and women have a responsibility to fit the particular 
                                                
33 Ronald Dworkin, ‘The Original Position’ (1973) 40 U Chi L Rev 500 (reprinted as 
‘Justice and Rights’ in Dworkin (n 1) 150-83; references will be made to this version)  
34 Dworkin, Justice for Hedgehogs (n 5) 63-6; see ibid 63: “moral judgments are 
constructed, not discovered: they issue from an intellectual device adopted to confront 
practical, not theoretical, problems.” 
35 Dworkin ‘Justice and Rights’ (n 33) 160 
36 ibid 
37 ibid 
judgments on which they act into a coherent program or action, or, at least, that 
officials who exercise power over other men have that sort of responsibility.  
b) Interpretive. Later on, in his exchange with Stanley Fish on legal vis-à-
vis literary interpretation38 and throughout his works, but especially in Law’s 
Empire,39 Dworkin reinforces not only that the model is constructive and to 
some extent creative but clarifies that it is not inventive but interpretive of the 
practice. In other words, since law is an “interpretive concept” the proper 
method requires a “constructive interpretation” of the practice. In that sense, 
on one side, Dworkin is adamant in his criticism of “semantic theories of law”, 
which he labels as “the semantic sting”, because they appear to consider the 
concept of law as a “criterial concept”40 and even a “natural kind concept”41 
with necessary and sufficient conditions, whereas it is an “interpretive 
concept”.42 And, on the other, firstly, defines: “constructive interpretation is a 
matter of imposing purpose on an object or practice in order to make of it the 
                                                
38 See Ronald Dworkin, ‘Law as Interpretation’ (1982) 9 Critical Inquiry 179 (reprinted in 
60 Texas L Rev 527 (1982); in WJT Mitchell (ed), The Politics of Interpretation (Chicago UP 1983); 
and revised as ‘How Law Is Like Literature’ in A Matter of Principle (n 32); references will be 
made to this version); and see also Ronald Dworkin, ‘My Reply to Stanley Fish (and Walter 
Benn Michaels): Please Don’t Talk about Objectivity Any More’, in WJT Mitchell (ed) (n 38) 
(reprinted in an altered and abbreviated form as ‘On Interpretation and Objectivity’, in A Matter 
of Principle (n 32); references will be made to this version); cf Stanley Fish, ‘Working on the 
Chain Gang: Interpretation in Law and Literature’ (1982) 9 Critical Inquiry 201 (reprinted in 60 
Texas L Rev 551; in WJT Mitchell (ed) (n 38); cf also Stanley Fish, ‘Wrong Again’ (1983) Texas L 
Rev 299 
39 See Dworkin, Law’s Empire (n 5) 
40 ibid 31-44; Ronald Dworkin, Justice in Robes (Harvard UP 2006) 9-12; and Dworkin, 
Justice for Hedgehogs (n 5) 158-9 
41 See Dworkin, Justice in Robes (n 40) 10; and Dworkin, Justice for Hedgehogs (n 5) 
158-9 
42 See Dworkin, ‘How Law Is Like Literature’ (n 38) 146-8; Law’s Empire (n 5) 45-96; 
Dworkin, Justice in Robes (n 40) 10-2; and Dworkin, Justice for Hedgehogs (n 5) 160-3, 403-5  
best possible example of the form or genre to which it is taken to belong.”43 
Secondly, delineates three stages of constructive interpretation:44  
First, there must be a “preinterpretive” stage in which the rules and standards taken to 
provide the tentative content of the practice are identified… Second, there must be an 
interpretive stage at which the interpreter settles on some general justification for the 
main elements of the practice identified at the preinterpretive stage… Finally, there 
must be a postinterpretive or reforming stage, at which he adjusts his sense of what the 
practice “really” requires so as better to serve the justification he accepts at the 
interpretive stage.  
And, thirdly, insists that its nature is interpretive rather than inventive: 
“The justification need not fit every aspect or feature of the standing practice, 
but it must fit enough for the interpreter to be able to see himself as 
interpreting that practice, not inventing a new one.”45 
c) Evaluative. Although in “How Law is Like Literature” Dworkin seemed 
to diminish the evaluative as well as the descriptive in the process of 
emphasizing the interpretative, at the end it was clear that he has been 
endorsing a moral reading of the practice, which requires references to value 
                                                
43 Dworkin, Law’s Empire (n 5) 52; see ibid 90: “constructive interpretations… try to 
show legal practice as a whole in its best light, to achieve equilibrium between legal practice as 
they find it and the best justification of that practice.” In that sense, Dworkin’s interpretive 
model is not merely applicative but argumentative as well, see Imer B Flores, ‘¿Es el derecho 
un modelo aplicativo?’ in Juan Federico Arriola Cantero and Víctor Rojas Amandi (eds), La 
filosofía del derecho hoy (Porrúa 2010) 
44 Dworkin, Law’s Empire (n 5); cf Imer B Flores, ‘Natalie Stoljar’s Wishful Thinking and 
One Step Beyond: What Should Conceptual Legal Analysis Become?’ (2012) 6 Problema. 
Anuario de Filosofía y Teoría del Derecho 81, 97 
45 Dworkin, Law’s Empire (n 5) 66; see ibid 67: “He also needs convictions about how far 
the justification he proposes at the interpretive stage must fit the standing features of the 
practice to count as an interpretation of it rather than the invention of something new.” See 
also Dworkin, Justice in Robes (n 40) 15: “Any lawyer has built up, through education, training, 
and experience, his own sense of when an interpretation fits well enough to count as an 
interpretation rather than as an invention.” 
and even value judgments that are not subjective but objective.46 On the one 
hand, Dworkin affirmed: “propositions of law are not merely descriptive of legal 
history, in a straightforward way, nor are they simply evaluative in some way 
divorced from legal history. They are interpretive of legal history, which 
combines elements of both description and evaluation but is different from 
both.”47 On the other hand, he clarified (with the “rules of courtesy” as 
example) that the “interpretive attitude” has two components, i.e. an 
assumption that it has an objective value (or point) and a further assumption 
that it is sensitive to it. In Dworkin’s voice:48  
The first is the assumption that the practice of courtesy does not simply exist but has 
value, that it serves some interest or purpose or enforces some principle --in short, that 
it has some point-- that can be stated independently of just describing the rules that 
make up that the practice. The second is the further assumption that the requirements 
of courtesy --the behavior it calls for or judgments it warrants-- are not necessarily or 
exclusively what they have always been taken to be but are instead sensitive to its 
point, so that the strict rules must be understood or applied or extended or modified or 
qualified or limited by that point. Once this interpretive attitude takes hold, the 
institution of courtesy ceases to be mechanical; it is no longer unstudied deference to a 
runic order. People now try to impose meaning on the institution --to see its best light--
and then to restructure it in the light of that meaning.        
                                                
46 See Dworkin, A Matter of Principle (n 32); Dworkin, Law’s Empire (n 5); Ronald 
Dworkin, Freedom’s Law. The Moral Reading of the American Constitution (Harvard UP 1996), 
especially ‘Introduction: The Moral Reading and the Majoritarian Premise’ in ibid 1-38; 
Dworkin, Justice in Robes (n 40); and Dworkin, Justice for Hedgehogs (n 5); cf Imer B Flores, 
‘¿Ensueño, pesadilla o realidad? Objetividad e (in)determinación en la interpretación del 
derecho’ in Enrique Cáceres et al. (eds), Problemas contemporáneos de la filosofía del derecho 
(UNAM 2005) 185-92 and 192-4; and Imer B Flores,  ‘Legisprudence: The Role and Rationality 
of Legislators --vis-à-vis Judges-- towards the Realization of Justice’ (2009) 1:2 Mexican Law 
Review 91, 97-100; cf also Imer B Flores, ‘The Living Tree: Fixity and Flexibility. A General 
Theory of (Judicial Review in a) Constitutional Democracy?’ (2008) 2 Problema. Anuario de 
Filosofía y Teoría del Derecho 285; and Imer B Flores, ‘The Living Tree Constitutionalism: Fixity 
and Flexibility’ (2009) 3 Problema. Anuario de Filosofía y Teoría del Derecho 37 
47 Dworkin, ‘How Law Is Like Literature’ (n 38) 147 
48 Dworkin, Law’s Empire (n 5) 47 (emphasis original) 
d) Integrative. In Law’s Empire Dworkin advanced his conception of “law 
as integrity”, which is highly dependent on the idea of coherence and fit,49 but 
in “Hart’s Postscript and the Character of Political Philosophy”,50 Dworkin --by 
criticizing Hart’s defense of an Archimedean jurisprudence-- developed an 
argument against a detached conception of values and for an integrated 
                                                
49 See ibid 94-6, especially 96: “[Law as integrity] argues that rights and responsibilities 
flow from past decisions and so count as legal, not just when they are explicit in these 
decisions but also when they follow from the principles of personal and political morality the 
explicit decisions presuppose by way of justification”; see also ibid, 176-224 and 225-75, 
especially 176: “We have two principles of political integrity: a legislative principle, which asks 
law makers to try to make the total set of laws morally coherent, and an adjudicative principle, 
which instructs that the law be seen as coherent in that way, so far as possible” (emphasis 
added); ibid 225: “Law as integrity denies that statements of law are either the backward-
looking factual reports of conventionalism or the forward-looking instrumental programs of 
legal pragmatism. It insists that legal claims are interpretive judgments and therefore combine 
backward- and forward-looking elements; they interpret contemporary legal practice seen as an 
unfolding political narrative. So law as integrity rejects as unhelpful the ancient question 
whether judges find or invent law; we understand legal reasoning, it suggests, only by seeing 
the sense in which they do both and neither”; and, ibid 406: “We hope that our legislature will 
recognize what justice requires so that no practical conflict remains between justice and 
legislative supremacy; we hope that departments of law will be rearranged, in professional and 
public understanding, to map true distinctions of principle, so that local priority presents no 
impediment to a judge seeking a natural flow of principle throughout the law.” cf Imer B Flores, 
‘The Quest for Legisprudence: Constitutionalism v. Legalism’ in Luc J. WINTGENS (ed), The 
Theory and Practice of Legislation: Essays on Legisprudence (Ashgate 2005) 35-8 and 43-7; Imer 
B Flores, ‘Legisprudence: The Forms and Limits of Legislation’ (2007) 1 Problema. Anuario de 
Filosofía y Teoría del Derecho 247, 257-60 and 264-6; and Flores (n 46) 100-6 and 106-9; cf 
also Imer B Flores, ‘La cama o el lecho de Procrustes: Hacia una jurisprudencia comparada e 
integrada’ (2008) Número Conmemorativo Sexagésimo Aniversario Boletín Mexicano de Derecho 
Comparado 273, 294-311; and Imer B Flores, ‘The Problem about the Nature of Law vis-à-vis 
Legal Rationality Revisited: Towards an Integrative Jurisprudence’, in Waluchow and Sciaraffa 
(n 26),  115-23 
50 See Ronald Dworkin, ‘Hart’s Postscript and the Character of Political Philosophy’ 
(2004) 24 OJLS 1 (reprinted as ‘Hart’s Postscript and the Point of Political Philosophy’ in 
Dworkin, Justice in Robes (n 40) references will be made to this version) 
conception of values. In a few words, Dworkin commences by affirming that “It 
would make a little sense to treat the political values… as detached values”;51 
continues by announcing that “political values are integrated rather than 
detached”52 and by asserting that “Law is a political concept”;53 and, concludes 
by avowing that this project “must find the place of each value in a larger and 
mutually supporting web of conviction that displays supporting connections 
among moral and political values generally and then places these in the still 
larger context of ethics.”54  
This claim, i.e. integrated values, advanced the thesis of the unity of 
value, which was proclaimed at the beginning of Justice for Hedgehogs “This 
book defends a large and old philosophical thesis: the unity of value”,55 and is 
Dworkin response to the causes usually associated with foxes, i.e. value 
skepticism, subjectivism, relativism and pluralism. Nevertheless, let me 
reiterate that this thesis, in my opinion, can be traced all the way back to the 
early publication of “The Model of Rules I” in 1967: “[principles] have a 
dimension that rules do not --the dimension of weight or importance” and 
“principles rather hang together than link together [as rules do]”.56 
Furthermore, in the process of reinforcing his argument, Dworkin makes 
a dual claim for “independence of morality from science and metaphysics” 
(Hume’s principle) and for “interdependence of morality and ethics” (Kant’s 
                                                
51 ibid 158 
52 ibid 159 
53 ibid 162 
54 ibid 168; see ibid 160: “must try to understand them holistically and interpretively, 
each in the light of the others, organized not in a hierarchy but in a fashion of a geodesic 
dome.” 
55 Dworkin, Justice for Hedgehogs (n 5) 1 
56 Dworkin, ‘Model of Rules I’ (n 5) 26 and 41; cf Imer B. Flores, ‘Ronald Dworkin’s 
Justice for Hedgehogs and Partnership Conception of Democracy (With a Comment to Jeremy 
Waldron’s “A Majority in the Lifeboat”)’ (2010) 4 Problema. Anuario de Filosofía y Teoría del 
Derecho 65, 67-8 fn 4; and Imer B. Flores, ‘Proportionality in Constitutional and Human Rights 
Interpretation’ (2013) 7 Problema. Anuario de Filosofía y Teoría del Derecho 83, 99 fn 41 
principle).57 In a few words, Dworkin attacked the Archimedean epistemology 
and defended an integrated epistemology: “Our moral epistemology --our 
account of good reasoning about moral matters-- must be an integrated rather 
than an Archimedean epistemology, and it must therefore be itself a 
substantive, first-order moral theory.”58 Likewise, he appealed not only to “the 
character of interpretation and of interpretive truth and the independence of 
both ethical and moral truth from science and metaphysics” but also to an 
“interpretive integration of ethics and morality”.59  
Finally, regarding law and morality, Dworkin, in an autobiographical 
paragraph in Chapter 19 of his Justice for Hedgehogs, acknowledged --or more 
precisely confessed:60   
When more than forty years ago I first tried to defend interpretivism, I defended it 
within this orthodox two-systems picture. I assumed that law and morals are different 
systems of norms and that the crucial question is how to they interact. So I said… that 
the law includes not just enacted rules, or rules with pedigree, but justifying principles 
as well. I soon came to think, however, that the two-systems picture of the problem was 
itself flawed, and I began to approach the issue through a very different picture. I did 
not fully appreciate the nature of that picture, however, or how different it is from the 
orthodox model, until I began to consider the larger issues of this book. 
So instead of considering law and morality as two separate systems, 
Dworkin has replaced it with a one-system picture, which now treats “law as a 
part of political morality” and recalled the aim of the book: “Our aim has been 
to integrate what are often taken to be separate departments of evaluation: we 
can easily place the doctrinal concept of law in that tree structure: law is a 
branch, a subdivision, of political morality.”61 What’s more Dworkin recognizes 
                                                
57 Dworkin, Justice for Hedgehogs (n 5) 19 
58 ibid 100; see ibid 82: “we must make assumptions about what is true in order to test 
theories about how to decide what is true.” 
59 ibid 14; see Ronald Dworkin, Religion Without God (Harvard UP 2013) 90 
60 Dworkin, Justice for Hedgehogs (n 5) 402 (internal references are omitted); cf 
Dworkin, ‘Model of Rules I’ (n 5) and ‘Model of Rules II’ (n 5) 
61 Dworkin, Justice for Hedgehogs (n 5) 405 
the existence of a difficult question and hints into its answer: “The more 
difficult question is how that concept [i.e. law] should be distinguished to show 
one as a distinct part of the other. Any plausible answer will center on the 
phenomenon of institutionalization.”62 
V. Dworkin’s One Right Answer Thesis Reconsidered 
To conclude I will like to briefly reconsider Dworkin’s one right answer thesis in 
the light of his constructive, interpretive (and even argumentative), evaluative 
and integrative model. However, let me recall first its appearance and 
development.  
At the core of his criticism of legal positivism, Dworkin cautioned:63 
To say that someone has a ‘legal obligation’ is to say that his case falls under a valid 
legal rule that requires him to do or to forbear form doing something. (To say he has a 
legal right, or has a legal power of some sort, or a legal privilege or immunity, is to 
assert, in a shorthand way, that other have an actual or hypothetical legal obligations 
to act or not to act in certain ways touching him.) In the absence of such a valid legal 
rule there is no legal obligation; it follows that when the judge decides an issue by 
exercising his discretion, he is not enforcing a legal right as to that issue. 
According to this criticism, the judge that excercises discretion in hard 
cases is not applying the already existing law but acting as if he was the 
legislator to the extent of either creating new law or changing the existing one 
and what is even worse he is doing it ex post facto, which amounts to a 
violation of concrete principles such as the division or separation of powers and 
the irretroactivity of the law and more abstract principles such as certainty, 
generality, legality, and normativity. On the contrary, Dworkin claims not only 
that the judge by appealing to the underlying justifying principles will still be 
applying already existing law without having to create new law or to change the 
                                                
62 ibid; see Dworkin, Justice in Robes (n 40) 34-5: “We might treat law not as separate 
from but as a department of morality. We understand political theory that way: as part of 
morality more generally understood but distinguished, with its own distinct substance, 
because applicable to distinct institutional structures. We might treat legal theory as a special 
part of political morality distinguished by a further refinement of institutional structures.” 
63 Dworkin (n 1) 17  
existing one but also that there is and even must be one right answer to every 
legal question. 
In the process of defending the one right answer thesis,64 on the one 
hand, in the center of “Hard Cases”, Dworkin constructs an imaginary judge 
named Hercules:65 
[A] lawyer of superhuman skill, learning, patience and acumen, whom I shall 
call Hercules… a judge in some representative American jurisdiction… [who] 
accepts the main uncontroversial constitutive and regulative rules of the law in 
his jurisdiction…that is, that statutes have the general power to create and 
extinguish legal rights, and that judges have the general duty to follow earlier 
decisions of their court or higher courts whose rationale… extends to the case at 
bar. 
On the other hand, in the core of “Can Rights be Controversial?”, 
continues with his defensive move: “My arguments suppose that there is often 
a single right answer to complex questions of law and political morality. The 
objection replies that there is sometimes no single right answer, but only 
answers.”66  
Notwithstanding, by the time of the original publication of his “No Right 
Answer?”, his defense is already part of his attack: “For all practical purposes, 
there will always be a right answer in the seamless web of our law.”67 Though 
this sentence does not appear in the version republished as “Is There Really No 
                                                
64 Although Stephen Guest used to emphasize that Dworkin’s “one right answer” thesis 
was “purely defensive”, I will like to suggest that Dworkin’s defense became part of his offense 
as both the adagio “The best offense is a good defense” and the proverb “a meilleur défense c'est 
l'attaque”, i.e. “attack is the best defense”, suggest; see Stephen Guest, Ronald Dworkin 
(Stanford UP 1992) 137-47, especially ibid 145: “Dworkin’s thesis is… a defensive thesis to the 
criticism that there cannot be right answers in hard cases where there is no ‘proof’ or 
demonstration”; cf ibid (3rd edn, 2013) 135-43 
65 Dworkin, ‘Hard Cases’ (n 5) 105-6  
66 Dworkin (n 1) 279 
67 Ronald Dworkin, ‘No Right Answer?’ in PMS Hacker and J Raz (eds), Law, Morality 
and Society: Essays in Honour of H.L.A. Hart (OUP 1977) 84 
Right Answer in Hard Cases?”,68 I am certain that Dworkin did not change his 
mind since, in 1996, in his “Objectivity and Truth: You’d Better Believe It”, he 
insisted in his counter-attack: “This “no right answer” thesis cannot be true by 
default in law any more than in ethics or aesthetics or morals.”69  
What’s more, in Justice for Hedgehogs, Dworkin distinguished between 
indeterminacy and uncertainty: “But in all these aspects indeterminacy differs 
from uncertainty. “I am uncertain whether the proposition in question is true 
or false” is plainly consistent with “It is one or the other,” but “The proposition 
in question is neither true nor false” is not.”70 
In a few words, Dworkin by differentiating indeterminacy from 
uncertainty, as he previously did by constructing Hercules, is able to separate 
the lack of certainty, i.e. a final demonstration or proof, from the claim for 
determinacy, i.e. a preexisting one right answer for every legal question being 
already somehow “out there”.  
Let me clarify that “out there” in Dworkin’s model means that the answer 
is, on the one hand, not to be discovered (or deducted) but to be constructed, 
from the already preexisting legal materials; and, on the other hand, not to be 
invented (or created and even changed) but to be interpreted (and even argued 
for), again from the already preexisting legal materials. Similarly, the one right 
answer thesis can be constructed and interpreted from the already preexisting 
legal materials because it can be evaluated from the underlying principles, 
including moral ones, which are not only objective and justify the practice but 
also integrated into law. 
                                                
68 See Ronald Dworkin, ‘Is There Really No Right Answer in Hard Cases?’ in A Matter of 
Principle (n 32) 
69 Ronald Dworkin, ‘Objectivity and Truth: You’d Better Believe It’ (1996) 25 Philosophy 
and Public Affairs 87, 136 
70 Dworkin, Justice for Hedgehogs (n 5) 91; cf Imer B Flores, ‘H.L.A. Hart’s Moderate 
Indeterminacy Thesis Reconsidered: In Between Scylla and Charybdis?’ (2011) 5 Problema. 
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Finally, against the critique that the preexisting legal materials may 
appear to be contradictory and even incommensurable, Dworkin provides an 
interpretation following his unity of value thesis that reconciles values by 
showing that moral conflict requires a deeper form of collaboration to solve the 
apparent conflict and even to figure out a point of comparison or contrast, to 
the extent that somehow the one right answer will despite all still be available 
in very crazy cases.71 For that purpose Dworkin develops a variation of the 
drowning swimmer case, in which he first poses the problem and later reflects 
upon it:72  
One person clings to a life preserver in a storm that has wrecked her boat; sharks circle 
her. Two other passengers cling to another life preserver a hundred yards away; sharks 
circle them as well. You have a boat on shore. You can reach one life preserver in time, 
but then not the other one. Assuming all three are strangers, do you have a duty to 
save the two swimmers and let the lone swimmer die? 
[…] 
But if we approach the decision in another way --by concentrating not on 
consequences but on rights-- it is far from plain that we should automatically save the 
greater number. We might think that each victim has an equal antecedent right to be 
saved, and we might therefore be tempted by a lottery in which each shipwreck victim 
has at least one-third chance to be saved. (The sharks agree to circle while the lottery is 
conducted.) 
In sum, although most people will appear to be automatically inclined to 
save two, due to the bare fact that they are more than one, it is far from clear 
that that is a right answer. Actually, saving the greater number may seem to be 
the right answer from a consequentialist approach, but not according to a 
                                                
71 See Dworkin, Justice for Hedgehogs (n 5) 120; see also Ronald Dworkin’s, Life’s 
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principles and rights conception, in which each victim has an equal antecedent 
right to be saved and must be treated with equal concern and respect, as 
Dworkin has been advocating throughout his works, ever since the publication 
of his Taking Rights Seriously and all the way to Justice for Hedgehogs, 
including not only “Rights as Trumps” but also his Sovereign Virtue. The Theory 
and Practice of Equality. In my opinion, all this reinforces the idea that the one 
right answer is already presupposed by the dworkinian model, which not only 
is constructive, interpretive (and even argumentative), evaluative and 
integrative, but also integrates among the preexisting legal materials the 
human rights.73 
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